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Abstract
Without a cure, vaccine, or proven long-term immunity against SARS-CoV-2, test-trace-
and-isolate (TTI) strategies present a promising tool to contain the viral spread. For any
TTI strategy, however, a major challenge arises from pre- and asymptomatic transmission
as well as TTI-avoiders, which contribute to “hidden”, unnoticed infection chains. In our
semi-analytical model, we identified two distinct tipping points between controlled and
uncontrolled spreading: one, at which the behavior-driven reproduction number RHt of the
hidden infections becomes too large to be compensated by the available TTI capabilities,
and one at which the number of new infections starts to exceed the tracing capacity, causing
a self-accelerating spread. We investigated how these tipping points depend on realistic
limitations like limited cooperativity, missing contacts, and imperfect isolation, finding
that TTI is likely not sufficient to contain the natural spread of SARS-CoV-2. Therefore,
complementary measures like reduced physical contacts and improved hygiene probably
remain necessary.
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Introduction
After SARS-CoV-2 started spreading rapidly around the globe in early 2020, many countries have successfully
curbed the initial exponential rise in case numbers (“first wave”). Most of the successful countries employed a
mix of measures combining hygiene regulations and mandatory physical distancing to reduce the reproduction
number and the number of new infections [1, 2] together with testing, contact tracing, and isolation (TTI) of
known cases [3, 4]. Among these measures, those aimed at distancing — like school closures and a ban of all
unnecessary social contacts (“strict lockdown”) — were highly controversial, but have proven effective [1, 2].
Notwithstanding, distancing measures put an enormous burden on society and economy. In countries that
have controlled the initial outbreak, there is a strong motivation to relax distancing measures, albeit under
the constraint to keep the spread of COVID-19 under control [5].
In principle, it seems possible that both goals can be reached when relying on the increased testing capacity
for SARS-CoV-2 infections if complemented by contact tracing and quarantine measures (e.g. like TTI
strategies [4]); South Korea and Singapore illustrate the success of such a strategy [6–8]. In practice, resources
for testing are still limited and costly, and health systems have capacity limits for the number of contacts that
can be traced and isolated; these resources have to be allocated wisely in order to control disease spread [9].
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Figure 1: Graphical abstract - summarizing the study
TTI strategies have to overcome several challenges to be effective. Infected individuals can become infectious
before developing symptoms [10,11], and because the virus is quite infectious, it is crucial to minimize testing
and tracing delays [12]. Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 infections surfacing widely distributed (instead of in
clusters), which hinders an efficient and quick implementation of TTI strategies.
Hence, the effects of central challenges that impact and potentially limit the effectiveness of TTI need to
be incorporated together into one model of COVID-19 control, namely (1) the existence of asymptomatic,
yet infectious carriers [13, 14] — which are a challenge for symptom-driven but not for random testing
strategies; (2) the existence of a certain fraction of the population that is opposed to taking a test, even if
symptomatic [15]; (3) the capacity limits of contact tracing and additional imperfections due to imperfect
memory or non-cooperation of the infected. Lastly, a certain influx of COVID-19 cases into a given community
seems unavoidable at present due to the global spread of SARS-CoV-2, the relaxation of travel restrictions
and the level of interconnection of some localities [5, 16]. This influx makes virus eradication impossible;
it only leaves a stable level of new infections or their uncontrolled growth as the two possible regimes of
disease dynamics. Thus, policy makers at all levels, from nations to federal states, all the way down to small
units like enterprises, universities or schools, are faced with the question of how to relax physical distancing
measures while confining COVID-19 progression with the available testing and contact-tracing capacity [17].
Here we employ a compartmental model of SARS-CoV-2 spreading dynamics that incorporates the challenges
(1)-(3). We base the model parameters on literature or reports using the example of Germany. The aim
is to determine the critical value for the reproduction number in the general (not quarantined) population
(RHcrit), for which disease spread can still be contained. We find that — even under an optimal use of the
available testing and contract tracing capacity — the hidden reproduction number RHt has to be maintained
at sufficiently low levels, namely RHt < RHcrit ≈ 2 (95 % CI: 1.42–2.70). Hence, hygiene and physical distancing
measures are required in addition to TTI to keep the virus spread under control.
To further assist the efficient use of resources, we investigate the relative merits of contact tracing, symptom-
driven and random testing. We demonstrate the danger of a tipping point associated to the limited capacity
of tracing contacts of infected people. Last but not least, we show how either testing scheme has to be
increased to re-stabilize disease spread after an increase in the reproduction number.
Results
Model Overview
We developed an SIR-type model [18,19] with multiple compartments that incorporates the effects of test-
trace-and-isolate (TTI) strategies (for a graphical representation of the model see Figs. 2,S1). We explore
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how TTI can contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 for realistic scenarios based on the TTI system in Germany.
A major difficulty in controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2 are the cases that remain hidden and behave as
the general population does, potentially having many contacts. We explicitly incorporate such a “hidden”
pool H into our model and characterize the spread within by the reproduction number RHt , which reflects
the population’s contact behavior. Cases remain hidden until they enter a “traced” pool through testing
or by contact tracing of an individual that has already been tested positive (see Fig. 2). All individuals in
the traced pool T isolate themselves (quarantine), reducing the reproduction number to RTt . Apart from a
small leak, novel infections therein are then assumed to remain within the traced pool. We investigate both
symptom-driven and random testing, which differ in the cases they can reveal: random testing can in principle
uncover even asymptomatic cases, while symptom-driven testing is limited to symptomatic cases willing to
be tested. Parameters describing the spreading dynamics (Tab. 1) are based on the available literature on
COVID-19 [14, 15, 20–22], while parameters describing the TTI system are inspired by our example case
Germany wherever possible.
We provide the code of the different analyses at https://github.com/Priesemann-Group/covid19_tti.
An interactive platform to simulate scenarios different from those presented here is available (beta-version)
on the same GitHub repository.
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Figure 2: Illustration of interactions between the hidden H and traced T pools in our model. In our
model, we distinguish two different infected population groups: the one that contains the infected individuals that
remain undetected until tested (hidden pool H), and the one with infected individuals that we already follow and
isolate (traced pool T ). Until noticed, an outbreak will fully occur in the hidden pool, where case numbers increase
according to this pool’s reproduction number RHt . Testing and tracing of hidden infections transfers them to the
traced pool and helps to empty the hidden pool; this prevents offspring infections and reduces the overall growth of
the outbreak. Due to the self-isolation imposed in the traced pool, its reproduction number RTt is expected to be
considerably smaller than RHt (i.e. RTt  RHt ), and typically smaller than 1. Once an individual is tested positive, all
the contacts since the infection are traced with some efficiency (η). Two external events further increase the number
of infections in the hidden pool, namely, the new contagions occurring in the traced pool that leak to the hidden pool
() and an external influx of infections (Φ). In the absence of new infections, pool sizes are naturally reduced due to
recovery (or removal), proportional to the recovery rate Γ.
TTI strategies can in principle control disease spread.
To demonstrate that TTI strategies can in principle control the disease spread, we simulated a new outbreak
starting in the hidden pool (Fig. 3). We assume that the outbreak is unnoticed initially, and then evaluate
the effects of two alternative testing and contact tracing strategies starting at day 0: Contact tracing is
either efficient, i.e. 66% (η = 0.66) of the contacts of a positively tested person are traced and isolated
without delay (“efficient tracing”), or contact tracing is assumed to be less efficient, identifying only 33%
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of the contacts (“inefficient tracing”). In both regimes, the default parameters are used (Tab. 1), which
include symptom-driven testing with rate λs = 0.1, and isolation of all tested positively, which reduces their
reproduction number by a factor of ν = 0.1.
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Figure 3: Sufficient testing and contact tracing can control the disease spread, insufficient only slows
it. We consider a TTI strategy with symptom-driven testing (λs = 0.1) and two tracing scenarios: For high tracing
efficiency (η = 0.66, (A-C)), the outbreak can be controlled by TTI; for low tracing efficiency (η = 0.33, (D-E)) the
outbreak cannot be controlled because tracing is not efficient enough. (A,D) Number of infections in the hidden
pool grows until the outbreak is noticed on day 0, at which point symptom-driven testing (λs = 0.1) and contact
tracing (η) starts. (B,E) Absolute number of daily infections (N) grows until the outbreak is noticed on day 0; the
observed number of daily infections (Nˆobs) shown here is simulated as being inferred from the traced pool and subject
to a gamma-distributed reporting delay with a median of 4 days. (C,F) The observed reproduction number Rˆobst is
estimated from the observed new infections Nˆobs. After an initial growth period, it settles to Rˆobst = 1 if the outbreak
is controlled (efficient tracing), or to Rˆobst > 1 if the outbreak continues to spread (inefficient tracing).
All the curves plotted are obtained from numerical integration of equations (1) - (5).
Efficient contact tracing rapidly depletes the hidden pool H and populates the traced pool T , and thus
stabilizes the total number of infections T +H (Fig. 3A). The system relaxes to its equilibrium, which is a
function of TTI and epidemiological parameters (equations (S2)–(S4) in section ). Consequently, the observed
number of daily infections (Nˆobs) approaches a constant value (Fig. 3B), while the observed reproduction
number Rˆobst approaches unity (Fig. 3C), further showing that effective TTI can be sufficient to stabilize the
disease spread with RHt = 1.8.
In contrast, inefficient contact tracing cannot deplete the hidden pool sufficiently quickly to stabilize the total
number of infections (Fig. 3D). Thus, the absolute and the observed daily number of infections N continue to
grow approximately exponentially (Fig. 3E). In this case, the TTI strategy with ineffective contact tracing
slows the spread, but cannot control the outbreak.
Test-trace-and-isolate strategies give rise to two novel stabilized regimes of spreading
dynamics.
Comparing the two TTI strategies from above demonstrates that two distinct types of spreading dynamics
are attainable under the condition of a non-zero influx of new cases Φ: The system either evolves towards
some intermediate, but stable number of new cases N (Fig. 3A-C), or it is unstable, showing a steep growth
(Fig. 3D-F). These two dynamics are characterized — after an initial transient — by different “observed”
reproduction numbers Rˆobst , inferred from the new cases of the traced pool Nˆobs. If Rˆobst = 1, the outbreak is
under control (solid in Fig. 3C), while for Rˆobst > 1 the outbreak continues to spread (Fig. 3F).
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These two regimes (stable or growing) are known from the standard SIR model with external influx Φ (blue
and red regions in Fig. 4A,B): If the reproduction number R is less than one, each new case infects less
than one new case on average, and the number of new cases in equilibrium Nˆobs∞ is finite (Fig. 4A). If R is
above one, each new case infects more than one new case, and the number of new cases grows quickly. These
regimes are reflected in the equilibrium observed reproduction number Rˆobs∞ : In the stable regime, Rˆobs∞ = 1,
and in the unstable regime Rˆobs∞ > 1.
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Figure 4: Testing and tracing give rise to two novel stabilized regimes of spreading dynamics. In the
simple SIR model with external influx (A,B), the spreading dynamics exhibit a stable and an unstable regime (blue
and red regions, respectively). In addition to these, our two-pool model exhibits (C,D) two novel “stabilized” regimes
that arise from the isolation of infected persons upon testing positive (green region) or upon being traced as a contact
of an infected person (amber region). (A) Observed case numbers Nˆobs∞ in the simple SIR model with external influx
approach a finite equilibrium in the stable regime (blue solid line). As the reproduction number R approaches the
critical point at R = 1, the case numbers in equilibrium Nˆobs∞ diverge, growing uncontrolled in the unstable regime.
(B) The asymptotic observed reproduction number Rˆobs∞ inferred from the observed new cases Nˆobs∞ in the simple SIR
model with external influx is always 1 in the stable regime, but reflects the true value R in the unstable regime (solid
grey line). (C) Daily number of new infections Nˆobs∞ in our two-pool model are finite in the stable and stabilized
regimes, but diverge upon approaching the critical points of the “testing only” or “testing and tracing” strategies
(dashed green and dotted orange lines, respectively). They are infinite in the unstable regime, or when the tracing
capacity limit is reached (black bar). The exact position of the critical points of the stabilized regimes depend on the
efficiencies of the respective strategies: Symptom-driven testing alone (η = 0, green) can only stabilize the spread for
Rˆobs∞ < R
H
crit|η=0 ≈ 1.5, while symptom-driven testing and tracing (η = 0.66, amber) can stabilize the spread for up
to RHt < RHcrit|η=0.66 ≈ 1.9 for our default parameters (Table. 1). (D) The observed reproduction number Rˆobs∞ of a
system stabilized by symptom-driven testing and tracing is always 1 in the “stable” and “testing-stabilized” regimes
(solid grey line). In the meta-stable “testing-and-tracing-stabilized” regime (dotted grey line), Rˆobs∞ = 1 as long as the
tracing capacity is not exceeded. If exceeded, the system behaves asymptotically as if there was only symptom-driven
testing in place (transition “1”, see also Fig. 5), which can only slow down, but not control the spread anymore. In
the “unstable” regime, the observed reproduction number Rˆobs∞ always increases with RHt – thus, the number of cases
always grows. As long as the tracing capacity is not exceeded by this growth, testing-and-tracing slows down the
spread (dotted grey line) – afterwards the system behaves asymptotically as if there was only symptom-driven testing
slowing down the spread (transition “2”, see also Fig. 6). The curves showing observed new cases are obtained from
the analytical description of the equilibrium for unlimited tracing capacity (equations (S2) - (S4)). The curves showing
the observed reproduction number are obtained from the linear stability analysis (equation (S1)).
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Distinct from the standard SIR model, our two-pool model with TTI exhibits two novel stable regimes of
spreading dynamics: The first regime requires only to isolate persons with positive test results (“testing-
stabilized”), the second requires in addition to find and isolate contacts of a positively tested person
(“tracing-stabilized”, Fig. 4C,D). Due to the stabilization, the transition to instability for these two regimes
is shifted towards hidden reproduction numbers RHt above one (dotted grey lines in Fig. 4C). As in the
classical stable regime, the number of new cases in equilibrium Nˆobs∞ diverges when approaching these novel
critical points (dashed green and dotted orange lines in Fig. 4C). The ultimately unstable regime begins
at RHt = RHcrit ' 1.9 for our default parameters. Note that RHcrit is below the basic reproduction number
reported for SARS-CoV-2 (R0 ≈ 3.3), however, it may already be attained by reducing contacts by 40 % from
levels at the beginning of the pandemic.
A limited tracing capacity renders the tracing-stabilized regime meta-stable.
The amount of contacts that can reliably be traced by health authorities is limited due to the work to be
performed by trained personnel: Contact persons have to be identified, informed, and ideally also counseled
during the preventive quarantine. Exceeding the tracing capacity limit destabilizes an otherwise stable regime,
rendering it effectively meta-stable (amber in Fig. 4C,D). Once the tracing capacity is exceeded, the system
will behave asymptotically as if it had testing only, i.e. the effective and observed reproduction number will
strongly increase (transition “1”) from dotted to dashed grey line in Fig. 4D).
This demonstrates that a low number of new infections is essential to control the spread when RHt > 1.
Crossing the capacity limit of tracing, Nmax, leads to a self-accelerating spread, and thereby presents a
qualitatively new tipping point to instability in an otherwise stable system.
A limited tracing capacity requires a safety margin to avoid new outbreaks.
The transition from the meta-stable regime to the unstable regime happens when the tracing system is
overwhelmed due to the number of observed new cases exceeding the tracing capacity (Nˆobs > Nmax). This
can occur because of an increased influx Φ of infected people, e.g. returning from holiday, or a super-spreading
event. As an example, we simulate here a short but large influx of 4000 cases within a few days at t = 0
(Fig. 5). We set two different capacity limits, reached at Nmax = 675 (or Nmax = 450) observed cases per
day (see methods). In both scenarios, the sudden influx leads to a jump of infections in the hidden pool
(Fig. 5A,D), followed by a fast increase in new traced cases (Fig. 5B,E). With sufficiently high tracing capacity,
the outbreak can then be contained, because during the initial shock Nˆobs does not exceed the capacity
limit Nmax (Fig. 5B, brown vs grey lines). In contrast, with lower capacity, the outbreak accelerates as soon
as the observed new cases Nˆobs exceeds the capacity limit Nmax. In essence, this scenario demonstrates
the meta-stability of the system introduced above; if the capacity limit is exceeded due to some external
perturbation, the tracing cannot compensate the perturbation and the spread gets out of control.
An alternative transition can occur when a relaxation of contact restrictions causes a slow growth in case
numbers. This slow growth accelerates dramatically after the tracing capacity limit is reached (Fig. 4D,
transition “2” within the red region from dotted to dashed). Thus, this is a transition from a slightly unstable
to a strongly unstable regime. To illustrate this, we simulated an increase of the hidden reproduction number
RHt (of a system in stable equilibrium) at t = 0, from RHt = 1.8 to a supercritical value RHt = 2, which
renders the system slightly unstable (Fig. 6). At t = 0, the case numbers start to grow slowly until the
observed number of new cases exceeds the tracing capacity limit Nmax. From thereon, the tracing system
breaks down and the growth self-accelerates. This is reflected in the steep rise of new cases after day 100 -
thus with a considerable delay after the change of RHt , i.e. the population’s behavior.
Both the initial change in the hidden reproduction number and the breakdown of the tracing system are
reflected in the observed reproduction number Rˆobst (Fig. 6C). It transits from stability (Rˆobst = 1) to
instability (Rˆobst > 1). However, the absolute values of Rˆobst are not very indicative about the public’s
behavior (RHt ), because already small changes in RHt can induce large transient changes in Rˆobst . In our
example, Rˆobst shows a strong deflection after t = 0, although RHt changes only slightly; later, at t ≈ 100 it
starts to ramp to a new value, although RHt did not change. This ramping is due to exceeding the tracing
capacity Nmax, and the spread starts to accelerate. Rˆobst finally approaches a new steady-state value, as
sketched in Fig. 4D. To summarize, deducing the stability of the spread from Rˆobst is challenging because
Rˆobst reacts very sensitively to many types of transients. RHt , in contrast, would be a reliable indicator of
true spreading behavior, but is not accessible easily.
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Figure 5: Limited tracing capacity makes a meta-stable system vulnerable to large influx events. A
single large influx event (4000 cases) drives a meta-stable system with reduced tracing capacity (reached at Nmax = 450)
to a new outbreak (D-F), while a meta-stable system with our default tracing capacity (reached at Nmax = 675) can
compensate a sudden influx of this size (A-C). (A,D) Number of infections in the hidden pool (dotted) jump due
to the influx event at t=0, and return to stability for default capacity (A) or continue to grow in the system with
reduced capacity (D). Correspondingly, the number of cases in the traced pool (solid) either slowly increases after the
event, and absorbs most infections before returning to stability (inset in A, time axis prolonged to 1000 days), or
proceeds to grow steeply (D). (B,E) The absolute number of new infections (dashed, yellow) jumps due to the large
influx event (solid, green). The daily observed cases (solid, brown) slowly increases after the event, and relaxes back
to baseline (A), or increases fast upon exceeding the maximum number of new observed cases Nmax (solid grey line)
for which tracing is effective. (C,F) The effective (dashed, red) and observed (solid, dark red) reproduction numbers
change transiently due to the influx event, before returning to one for the default tracing capacity. In the case of a
reduced tracing capacity and a new outbreak, they slowly begin to grow afterwards (F). All the curves plotted are
obtained from numerical integration of equations (1) - (5).
Containing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 probably requires both TTI strategies and
contact-reduction policies.
Above, we illustrated that a combination of symptom-driven testing and contact tracing can control the
outbreak for a default reproduction number of RHt = 1.8. We now ask how efficient the TTI scheme and
implementation must be to control the disease for a range of reproduction numbers— i.e. what TTI parameters
are necessary to avoid the tipping over to Rˆefft > 1. When assessing stability not only for a single scenario
along the RHt -axis, but for multiple parameter combinations, the tipping points turn into critical lines (or
surfaces). Here, we examine how these critical lines depend on different combinations of symptom-driven
testing, random testing, and contact tracing.
Random testing with tracing, but without symptom-driven testing (λs = 0), is not sufficient to contain an
outbreak (under our default parameters and RHt ≤ 1.5; Fig. 7A). This is because the rate of random testing λr
would have to be unrealistically large. It exceeds the current capacity of testing (λr,max ∼ 0.002, see Methods
for details), even if ten tests are pooled (λr ∼ 10λr,max [23]). Thus, the contribution of symptom-driven
testing is necessary to control any realistic new outbreak through TTI.
Contact tracing markedly contributes to outbreak mitigation (Fig. 7B). In its absence, i.e. when isolating
only individuals that were positive in a symptom-driven or random test, the outbreak can be controlled for
intermediate reproduction numbers (RHt < 2.5 in Fig. 7B) but not for higher ones if the limit of λr,max < 0.02
is respected.
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Figure 6: Relaxing restrictions can slowly overwhelm the tracing capacity and trigger a new outbreak.
(A) The hidden reproduction number increases from RHt = 1.8 to RHt = 2.0 (i.e. slightly above its critical value) at
t = 0 leads to a slow increase in traced active cases (solid blue). (B) When the number of observed new cases (solid
brown) exceeds the tracing capacity limit Nmax (solid grey), the tracing system breaks down and the outbreak starts
to accelerate. (C) After an initial transient at the onset of the change in RHt , the observed reproduction number
(solid red) faithfully reflects both the slight increase of the hidden reproduction number due to relaxation of contact
constraints, and the strong increase after the tracing capacity (solid grey) is exceeded at t ≈ 100. All the curves
plotted are obtained from numerical integration of equations (1) - (5).
The most effective combination appears to be symptom-driven testing together with contact tracing (Fig. 7C).
This combination shows stability even for spreads close to the basic reproduction number RHt = R0 ≈ 3.3,
when implemented extremely efficiently (e.g. with λs = 0.66 and η = 0.66). However, this implementation
would require that all symptomatic persons get tested within 1-2 days after getting infectious, thus potentially
already in their pre-symptomatic phase, which may be difficult to realize. (Note that the asymptomatic cases
are already accounted for in the model and do not pose an additional problem). Considering these difficulties,
the combination of symptom-driven testing and contact tracing appears to be sufficient to contain outbreaks
with intermediate reproduction numbers (RHt ∼ 2 can be controlled with e.g. λs ≤ 0.5 and η = 0.66, Fig. 7C).
Overall, our model suggests that the combination of timely symptom-driven testing within very few days,
together with isolation of positive cases and efficient contact tracing can be sufficient to control the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 given the reproduction number in the hidden pool is RHt ≈ 2 or lower. For random testing to
be effective, one would require much higher test rates than currently available in Germany.
Comparison of TTI strategies for compensating intermediate relaxation of contact
constraints.
There are currently strong incentives to loosen restrictive measures and return more to a pre-COVID-19
lifestyle [24,25]. Any such loosening, however, can lead to a higher reproduction number RHt , which could
potentially exceed the critical value RHcrit, for which current TTI strategies ensure stability. To retain stability
despite increasing RHt , this increase has to be compensated by stronger mitigation efforts, such as further
improvement of TTI. Thereby the critical value RHcrit is effectively increased. In the following, we compare the
capacity of the different TTI and model parameter changes to compensate for increases of the reproduction
number RHt . In detail, we start from the highest reproduction number that can be controlled by the default
parameters, RHcrit = 1.89, and calculate how each model parameter would have to be changed to achieve a
desired increase in RHcrit. For all default parameters, see Table 1.
First, we explore how well an increase of random and symptom-driven test rates can compensate an increase
in RHt (Fig. 8A). We find that random testing would need to increase extensively to compensate an increases
in RHt , i.e. λr quickly exceeds realistic values (grey lines in Fig. 8A).
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Figure 7: Symptom-driven testing and contact tracing need to be combined to control the disease.
Stability diagrams showing the boundaries (continuous curves) between the stable (controlled) and uncontrolled
regimes for different testing strategies combining random testing (rate λr), symptom-driven testing (rate λs), and
tracing (efficiency η). grey lines in plots with λr-axes indicate capacity limits (for our example Germany) on random
testing (λr,max) and when using pooling of 10 samples, i.e. 10λr,max. Colored lines depict the transitions between the
stable and the unstable regime for a given reproduction number RHt (colour-coded). The transition from stable to
unstable case numbers is explicitly annotated for RHt = 1.5 in panel A. (A) Combining tracing and random testing
without symptom-driven testing is in all cases not sufficient to control outbreaks, as the necessary random tests exceed
even the pooled testing capacity (10λr,max). (B) Combining random and symptom-driven testing strategies without
any contract tracing requires unrealistically high levels of random testing to control outbreaks with large reproduction
numbers in the hidden pool (RHt > 2.0). The required random tests to significantly change the stability boundaries
exceed the available capacity in Germany λr,max. Even taking into account the possibility of pooling tests (10λr,max)
often does not suffice to control outbreaks. (C) Combining symptom-driven testing and tracing suffices to control
outbreaks with realistic testing rates λs and tracing efficiencies η for moderate values of reproduction numbers in the
hidden pool, RHt , but fails to control the outbreak for large RHt . The curves showing the critical reproduction number
are obtained from the linear stability analysis (equation (S1)).
In contrast, scaling up symptom-driven testing can in principle compensate an increase of RHt up to about 3
(Fig. 8A). Beyond RHt = 3 and λs ≈ 0.4, λs increases more steeply, making this compensation increasingly
costly (Fig. 8A). Furthermore, levels of λs > 0.5 seem hard to realize as they would require testing within < 2
days of becoming infectious, i.e. while many infected are still pre-symptomatic. Realistically, only moderate
increases in RHt can be compensated by decreasing the average delay of symptom-driven testing alone.
Tracing the contacts of an infected person and asking them to quarantine preventively is an important
contribution to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2, if done without delay [3, 12]. As a default, we assumed
that a fraction η = 0.66 of contacts are traced and isolated within a day. This fraction can in principle be
increased further to compensate an increase in RHt and still guarantee stability (Fig. 8A). However, because η
is already high in the first place, its range is quite limited, and even perfect contact tracing cannot compensate
an RHt of 2.5.
As an alternative to improved TTI rates and efficiencies, improved compliance may compensate an increase in
RHt : One might aim to reduce the number of contacts missed in the traced pool , improve the isolation factor
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Figure 8: Adapting testing strategies allows to relax contact constraints to some degree. Relaxing contact
constraints increases the reproduction number of the hidden pool RHt , and thus needs to be compensated for by
adjusting model parameters in order to keep the system stable. (A-C) Value of a single parameter required to keep the
system stable despite a change in the hidden reproduction number, while keeping all other parameters at default values.
(A) Increasing the rate of symptom-driven testing λs (blue) can in principle compensate for hidden reproduction
numbers close to R0. This is optimistic, however, as it requires that anyone with symptoms compatible with COVID-19
gets tested and isolated on average within 2.5 days – requiring large resources and efficient organization. Increasing the
random-testing rate λr (red) to the capacity limit (for the example Germany, grey line λr,max) would have almost no
effect, pooling tests to achieve 10λr,max can compensate for somewhat for larger increases in RHt . (B) Increasing the
tracing efficiency can compensate only small increases in RHt . (C) Decreasing the fraction of symptomatic individuals
avoiding testing ϕ, the leak from the traced pool  or the escape rate from isolation ν can in principle compensate
for small increases in RHt . (D-I) To compensate a 10% or 20% increase of RHt , and still keep the system stable,
symptom-driven testing λs could be increased (D), or  or φ could be decreased (H,I). In contrast, only changing λr,
η, or ν would not be sufficient to compensate a 10 % or 20 % increase in RHt , because their limits are reached (E,F,G).
All parameter changes are computed through stability analysis (equation (S1)).
ν, or reduce the fraction of people avoiding tests despite showing symptoms ϕ (Fig. 8C). These improvements
might be more difficult to achieve from a policy-maker perspective but could be targeted by educational and
awareness-raising campaigns. However, since we assumed already in the default scenario that the behavioral
factors (, ν, ϕ) are not too large, the potential improvement is limited.
The amount of reduction achievable by each method is limited, which calls to leverage all these strategies
together. Furthermore, as can be seen from the curvature of the lines in Fig. 7, the beneficial effects are
synergistic, i.e. they are larger when combining several strategies instead of spending twice the efforts on a
unique one. This synergy of improved TTI measures and awareness campaigning could allow to relax contact
constraints while keeping outbreaks under control. Nonetheless, our model still indicates that compensating
the basic reproduction number RHt = R0 ≈ 3.3 might be very costly, and hence some degree of physical
distancing might be required.
Robustness against parameter changes and model limitations
Above, we showed that changing the implementation of the TTI strategy can accommodate higher reproduction
numbers RHcrit – but how robust are these implementations against parameter uncertainties? To explore the
robustness of the resulting hidden reproduction number RHcrit against simultaneous variation of multiple TTI
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parameters, we draw these parameters from beta distributions (because all parameters are bounded by 0 and
1) centered on the default values and perform an error propagation analysis (Table S1). We found that a
hidden reproduction number of RHt ≤ 1.4 (95 % CI, 1.23–1.69) can be compensated by testing alone, whereas
additional contact tracing allows a hidden reproduction number of RHt ≤ 1.9 (95 % CI, 1.42–2.70, Fig. S2,
Tab. S1). This shows that the exact implementation of the TTI strategy strongly impacts the public behavior
that can be controlled, but none of them allows for a complete lifting of contact restrictions (R0 = 3.3).
Another aspect of robustness is not that against variation of parameters, but against variation of the model
and the underlying assumptions. Our model also comes with some inevitable simplifications, but these do not
compromise the conclusions drawn here. Specifically, our model is simple enough to allow for a mechanistic
understanding of its dynamics and analytical treatment of the control and stability problems. Owing to its
simplicity it has certain limitations: In contrast to agent-based simulations [26,27], we do not include realistic
contact structures [4, 5, 28] - the infection probability is uniform across the whole population. This limitation
will become relevant mostly when trying to devise even more efficient testing and tracing strategies, and when
a stabilization of a system very close to its tipping point is desired. Compared to other mean-field based
studies which included a more realistic temporal evolution of infectiousness [29,30], we implicitly assume that
infectiousness decays exponentially. This assumption has the disadvantage of making the interpretation of
rate parameters more difficult, but should not have an effect on the stability analyses presented here.
Discussion
Using a compartmental SIR-type model with realistic parameters based on our example case Germany, we find
that test-trace-and-isolate can, in principle, contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 if some physical distancing
measures are continued. We analytically derived the existence of a novel meta-stable regime of spreading
dynamics governed by the limited capacity of contact tracing and show how transient perturbations can tip a
seemingly stable system into the unstable regime. Furthermore, we explored the boundaries of this regime for
different TTI strategies and efficiencies of the TTI implementation.
Our results are in agreement with other simulation and modeling studies investigating how efficient TTI
strategies are in curbing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2. Both agent-based studies with realistic contact
structures [4] and studies using mean-field spreading dynamics with tractable equations [29,30] agree that
TTI measures are an important contribution to control the pandemic. Fast isolation is arguably the most
crucial factor, which is included in our model in the testing rate λs. Yet, TTI is generally not perfect and
the app-based solutions that have been proposed at present still lack the necessary large adoption that was
initially foreseen, and that is necessary for these solutions to work [30]. Our work as well as others [4, 30–32]
show that realistic TTI can compensate reproduction numbers of around 1.5-2.5, which is however lower
than the base reproduction number of around 3.3. This calls for continued contact reduction on the order
of 25–55 %, and it does not only highlight the importance of TTI, but also the need of other mitigation
measures.
Our work extends previous studies by combining the explicit modeling of a hidden pool (including test
avoiders) with the exploration of various ways of allocating testing and tracing resources. This allows us to
investigate the effectiveness of various approaches to stabilize disease dynamics in the face of a relaxation
of physical distancing. This yields important insights for policy makers into how to allocate resources. We
also include a capacity limit of tracing, which is typically not included in other studies, but important to
understand the meta-stable regime of a TTI-stabilized system, and to understand the importance of keeping a
safety distance to the critical reproduction number of a given TTI strategy. Last, we highlight the important
differences between the observed reproduction numbers — as they are reported in the media — and the more
important, but hard to access, reproduction number in the hidden pool. Specifically we show how transient
behavior of the observed reproduction number may be easily misinterpreted.
Limited TTI capacity implies a meta-stable regime with the risk of sudden explosive growth.
Both, testing as well as tracing contribute to containing the spread of SARS-CoV-2. However, if their capacity
limit is exceeded by the number of new infections, then an otherwise controlled spread becomes uncontrolled.
This is particularly troubling, because the spread is self-accelerating: the more the capacity limit is exceeded,
the less the testing and tracing can contribute to containment. To avoid this situation, the reproduction
number has to stay below its critical value, and the number of new infections below TTI capacity. Therefore,
it is advisable to maintain a safety margin to these limits. Otherwise, a small increase of the reproduction
number, super-spreading events [33], or sudden influx of new cases e.g. after holidays, lead to uncontrolled
spread. Re-establishing stability is then quite difficult.
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The relative efficiencies of random, symptom-driven and tracing-based testing should deter-
mine the allocation of resources. As the number of available tests is limited, a decision on how to
distribute these tests across the different strategies is important. In general, the more COVID-19 cases are
detected by the given number of tests, the more efficient their use is. Thus, the efficiency of test strategies in
terms of positive rate is a primary metric to determine the allocation of tests. Yet, in some situations special
considerations apply, and we will discuss those below.
Testing the persons identified by contact tracing is the most efficient strategy under conditions of low
prevalence. Here, the expected fraction of positive tests is RHt divided by the average number of traced
contacts. If we consider an average number of contacts of 30, combined with a tracing efficiency of 0.66,
we obtain an estimate for the efficiency of tracing based testing of RHt ·η/30·η ≈ 1/15 for an RHt of 2. In other
words, to detect a case of SARS-CoV-2 infection, 15 tests have to be invested. This relatively high efficiency
of contact-tracing based tests also suggests that contacts should isolate immediately after being identified as
a contact, not only after receiving a positive test. In fact, testing maybe slightly delayed in identified and
isolated contacts — to make sure these contacts are past their incubation period. Otherwise, false negative
results will lead to behavior enabling further disease spread.
For the efficiency of symptom-driven testing a similar estimate is much harder to obtain, and depends strongly
on which symptoms are included in the recommendations for testing. This is because symptoms of COVID-19
like fever and cough are unfortunately shared with other common respiratory infections; furthermore, in
children respiratory symptoms are usually less severe, and gastrointestinal symptoms may also be present [34]—
widening the array of symptoms that may indicate an infection with SARS-CoV-2. Thus, diseases like common
cold can produce an enormous number of individuals with symptoms, but not SARS-CoV-2 infections, that
may have to be included in testing. Realistically, the current efficiency of symptom-driven testing might be
close to the fraction of SARS-CoV-2 cases among all influenza-like cases, which is currently around 4% [35],
but will depend on influenza-seasonality and SARS-CoV-2 prevalence. However, if less specific symptoms
are also accounted for, the efficiency would currently be lower, probably close to the current rate of positive
tests in general. This means that roughly 25-100 symptom-driven tests may have to be administered for one
positive result at present. Therefore, symptom-driven testing is potentially less efficient than tests based
on contact tracing. Using a narrower set of symptoms for admission to COVID-19 testing will increase
efficiencies, but will inevitably increase the effective fraction of asymptomatic persons (ξap in our model). As
an example, the loss of smell or taste is a COVID-19 symptom [14,36,37] that has proven to be highly specific
(when combined with fever) in a recent prospective study [38]. However, allowing only individuals with this
symptom combination for testing will cover less than 67% of the symptomatic infected individuals ( [38],
Suppl. Table 1 therein). This leads to a rather large value for ξap, as those with the “wrong” symptoms are
then considered asymptomatic. Another important point to consider is that a moderate increase in λs may
be obtained with few additional tests (and a better organization of the test pipeline), but a larger increase
may require a strong relaxation of criteria for test admission, so that people can get tested earlier. This in
turn may lead to an excessive increase in symptom-driven test numbers. The efficiency of symptom-driven
testing is improved directly by hygiene and remaining physical distancing measures via easing the test-load
created by symptomatic carriers of other infections. Vaccination against influenza, for example, also falls into
this category of measures that reduce testing load. When authorities, however, rely mostly on testing and
contact tracing without any flanking physical distancing and hygiene regulations other infectious diseases
with COVID-19 like symptoms become a major concern.
In random testing, the efficiency of detecting SARS-CoV-2 infections is governed by the prevalence of the
infection in the general population. As long as this prevalence is low, a random test has a very low probability
to detect an infection. Thus, random testing should be reserved for specific scenarios, such as the protection
of communities where no infection must enter, e.g. nursing homes and hospitals, or communities with high
prevalence, i.e. those with locally clustered outbreaks.
In sum, our results suggest that testing capacities should be focused on testing traced contacts of infected
individuals, and on symptom-driven testing. Random testing seems to be useful only to protect particularly
vulnerable communities or around local hot spots of infections. Another use of random testing is to provide
some information about the current prevalence of the disease, and to facilitate estimates of the reproduction
number in the hidden pool RHt , which remains nevertheless difficult to estimate.
The cooperation of the general population in maintaining a low reproduction number is essen-
tial even with efficient TTI strategies in place. Our results illustrate that the reproduction number in
the hidden pool RHt — which reflects the public’s behavior — is still central to disease control. Specifically,
we found that RHt ≤ 1.4 (95 % CI, 1.23–1.69) can very likely be compensated by testing and isolating alone,
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whereas additional contract tracing shifts this boundary to RHt ≤ 1.9 (95 % CI, 1.42–2.70, Fig. S2, Tab. S1).
Both of these values are substantially lower than the basic reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2, R0 ≈ 3.3.
Thus, if the goal is to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 with the available TTI-related resources, the
reproduction number in the hidden pool will have to be reduced effectively by roughly 25− 55% compared
to the beginning of the pandemic. This effective reduction may be achieved by a suitable combination of
hygiene measures, such as mask wearing, filtering or exchange of contaminated air, and physical distancing.
Useful accompanying measures on a voluntary basis include: immediately and strictly self-isolating upon any
symptoms compatible with COVID-19, avoiding travel to any region with a higher infection rate, keeping a
personal contact diary, using the digital tracing app, selecting only those contacts that are essential for one’s
well being, and avoiding contacts inside closed rooms if possible. Most of these measures and also an efficient
tracing cannot be achieved without widespread cooperation of the population. This cooperation might be
increased by a ramping up of coordinated educational efforts around explaining mechanisms and dynamics of
disease spreading to a broad audience — instead of just providing behavioral advice.
Conclusion Based on a simulation of disease dynamics influenced by realistic TTI strategies with parameters
taken from the example of Germany, we show that the spreading dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 can only be
stabilized if effective TTI-strategies are combined with hygiene and physical distancing measures that keep
the reproduction number in the general population below a value of approximately RHt ≤ 1.9 (95 % CI,
1.42–2.70). As a system stabilized by TTI with a finite capacity is only in a meta-stable state and can be
tipped into instability by one-time effects, it would be desirable to keep a safety distance even to these values,
if possible. The above bounds on the reproduction number in the hidden pool can be easily recomputed for
other countries with different TTI capacities and reproduction numbers.
Methods
We model the spreading dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 as the sum of contributions from two pools, i.e. traced T
and hidden H infections (see sketch in Fig. 2). The first pool (T ) contains traced cases revealed through
testing or by contact tracing of an individual that has already been tested positive; all individuals in the
traced pool are assumed to isolate themselves (quarantine), avoiding further contacts as well as possible. In
contrast, in the second pool, infections spread silently, and only become detected when individuals develop
symptoms and get tested, or via random testing in the population. This second pool (H) is therefore called
the hidden pool H; individuals in this pool are assumed to exhibit the behavior of the general population,
thus of anyone who is not aware of being infected. We model the mean-field interactions between the hidden
and the traced pool, and distinguish between symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers. This is central when
exploring different testing strategies (as detailed below). We also include effects of non-compliance and
imperfect contact tracing, as well as a non-zero influx Φ of new cases entering from outside. As this influx
makes an eradication of SARS-CoV-2 impossible, only an exponential growth of cases or a stable rate of
new infections are possible modeling outcomes. Therefore, we frame our investigation as a stability problem,
where the aim is to implement test-trace-and-isolate strategies in a way that allows the system to remain
stable.
Spreading Dynamics
Concretely, we use a modified SIR-type model, where infections I are either symptomatic (Is) or asymptomatic
(Ia), and they belong to the hidden (H) or a traced (T ) pool of infections (Fig. 2), thus creating in total four
compartments of infections (Hs, Ha, T s, T a). New infections are asymptomatic with a ratio ξap, the others
are symptomatic. In all compartments individuals are removed with a rate Γ because of recovery or death
(see Tab. 1 for all parameters).
In the hidden pool, the disease spreads according to the reproduction number RHt . This reproduction number
reflects the disease spread in the general population, without testing induced isolation of individuals. In
addition, the hidden pool receives a mobility-induced influx Φ of new infections. Cases are removed from the
hidden pool (i) when detected by TTI, and put into the traced pool, or (ii) due to recovery or death.
The traced pool T contains those infected individuals who have been tested positive as well as their positively
tested contacts. As these individuals are (imperfectly) isolated, their reproduction number RHt is multiplied
by an isolation factor ν within the traced pool. We assume that they mainly spread infections to known
contacts, however, we also assume that some contacts of these isolated are missed, causing a leak  of infections
into the hidden pool. The reproduction number of the traced pool therefore is defined as: RTt = (ν + )RHt .
13
The challenges of containing SARS-CoV-2 via test-trace-and-isolate
Within our model, we concentrate on the case of low incidence and low fraction of immune people, as in any
new outbreak or for disease with quickly waning immunity [39]. Our model can also reflect innate or acquired
immunity; one then has to rescale the population or the reproduction number. The qualitative behavior of
the dynamics is not expected to change.
Parameter Choices and Scenarios
For any testing strategy, the fraction of infections that do not develop any symptoms across the whole
infection timeline is an important parameter, and this also holds for testing strategies applied to the case of
SARS-CoV-2. In our model this parameter is called ξap and includes beside true asymptomatic infections ξ
also the fraction of individuals that avoid testing ϕ.
The exact value of the fraction of asymptomatic infections ξ, however, is still fraught with uncertainty, and it
also depends on age [14,40,41]. While early estimates were as high as 50 % (for example ranging from 26 %
to 63 % [42]), these early estimates suffered from reporting bias, small sample sizes and sometimes included
pre-symptomatic cases as well [21,43]. Recent bias-corrected estimates from large sample sizes range between
12 % [21] and 33 % [22]. We decided to use 15 % for the pure asymptomatic ratio ξ.
In addition, we include a fraction ϕ of individuals avoiding testing. This can occur because individuals do not
want to be in contact with governmental authorities or because they deem risking a spread of SARS-CoV-2
less important than having to quarantine [15]. As this part of the population may act in the same manner as
asymptomatic persons, we include it in the asymptomatic compartment of the hidden pool, assuming a value
of 0.2. We thus arrive at an effective ratio of asymptomatic infections ξap = ξ + (1− ξ)ϕ = 0.32. We assume
that both, symptomatic and asymptomatic persons, have the same reproduction number.
In general, infected individuals move from the hidden to the traced pool after being tested; yet, also a small
number of infections will leak from the traced to the hidden pool with rate ΓRHt , with  = 0.1. A source
of leak would be a contact that has been infected, traced and tested positive, but still ignores quarantine
instructions. For the model, this individual has the same effect on disease dynamics as someone from the
hidden pool.
Another crucial parameter for any TTI strategy is the reproduction number in the hidden pool RHt . This
parameter is by definition impossible to measure, but it presents typically the main driver of the spreading
dynamics. It depends mainly on the contact behavior of the population, and ranges from R0 in the absence
of contact restrictions to values below 1 during strict lock-down [2]. For the default parameters of our
model, we used a value of RHt = 1.8. This value causes new infections to be approximately constant. A
constant number of new infections was observed for Germany during much of summer 2020 [44]. This value
of RHt = 1.8 is about 54 % lower than the basic reproduction number R0 ≈ 3.3, hence we assume that some
non-pharmacological interventions (physical distancing or hygiene measures) [1,2] are in place. For additional
scenarios, we explored the impact of both higher and lower values of RHt on our TTI strategy.
Testing-and-Tracing strategies
We consider three different testing-and-tracing strategies: random testing, symptom-driven testing and specific
testing of traced contacts. Despite the naming — chosen to be consistent with existing literature [4, 45–48]—
an isolation of the cases tested positive is part of all of these strategies. The main differences lie in whom the
tests are applied to and whether past contacts of an infected person are traced and told to isolate. Our model
simulates the parallel application of all three strategies – as it is typical for real-world settings, and yields the
effects of the “pure” application of these strategies as corner cases realized via specific parameter settings.
Random testing is defined here as applying tests to individuals irrespective of their symptom status, or
whether they belonging to the contact-chain of other infected individuals. In our model, random testing
transfers infected individuals from the hidden to the traced pool with fixed rate λr, irrespective of them
showing symptoms or not. In reality, random testing is often implemented as situation-based testing for
a sub-group of the population, e.g. at a hot-spot, for groups at risk, or for people returning from travel.
Such situation-based strategies would be more efficient than the random testing assumed in this model.
Nonetheless, because random testing can detect symptomatic and asymptomatic persons alike, we decided to
evaluate its potential contribution to contain the spread.
The number of random tests that can be performed is limited by the available laboratory and sample collection
capacity. For orientation, we included therefore a maximal testing capacity of λr,max = 0.002 test per person
and day, which reflects the laboratory capacity in Germany (1.2 Mio. per week) [44, 49]. Potentially, the
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testing capacity can be increased by pooling PCR-tests, without strongly reducing the sensitivity [23]. We
acknowledge this possibility by also taking into account a ten times larges testing capacity, 10 · λr,max = 0.02.
This would correspond to every person being tested on average every 50 days (7 weeks) - summing to about
12 Mio. tests per week in Germany.
Symptom-driven testing is defined as applying tests to individuals presenting symptoms of COVID-19.
In this context, it is important to note that non-infected individuals can have symptoms similar to those of
COVID-19, as many symptoms are rather unspecific. Although symptom-driven testing suffers less from
imperfect specificity, it can only uncover symptomatic cases that are willing to be tested (see below). Here,
symptomatic infected individuals are transferred from the hidden to the traced pool at rate λs.
We define λs as the rate at which a symptomatic infected individual gets tested per day. As default value we use
λs = 0.1, which means that one in ten people that show symptoms gets tested each day and are subsequently
isolated. In principle this rate could be increased to 1, reflecting that a symptomatic person is tested and
isolated after one day. For SARS-CoV-2, such a fast detection is unrealistic, because typically infected people
show a the delay of 1-2 days between the beginning of infectiousness and showing symptoms [50]. Hence,
λs ≈ 0.5 is an upper limit to the symptom-driven testing rate.
Tracing contacts of positively tested individuals presents a very specific test strategy, and is expected to be
effective in breaking the infection chains, if contacts self-isolate sufficiently quickly [4, 45, 51]. However as
every implementation of a TTI strategy is bound to be imperfect, we assume that only a fraction η < 1 of all
contacts can be traced. These contacts, if tested positive, are then transferred from the hidden to the traced
pool. We assumed a default value of η = 0.66, i.e. on average two thirds of the contacts are identified.
Contact tracing is mainly done by the health authorities in Germany, and this clearly limits the maximum
number Nmax of observed new cases Nˆobs, for which contact tracing is still functional. In the first part of the
manuscript, we assume for simplicity that Nˆobs is sufficiently small to not exceed the tracing capacity; in the
second part, we explicitly explore the role of this limit.
In principle, the tracing capacity limit can be expressed in two ways, either as the number of observed cases
Nˆobs, at which tracing starts to break down (denoted by Nmax), or as number of positive contacts that can
maximally be detected and handled on average by the health departments (nmax). Both values obviously
depend strongly on the TTI scenario, the population’s behavior, and the health departments. As default
value, we assume Nmax = 675. This corresponds to uncovering nmax = 300 positive contact persons by testing
and tracing from the hidden pool (in the default scenario). The other about 375 persons originate within
the traced pool (e.g. infected family members), and are therefore considered to be detected with much less
effort. The limit of nmax = 300 is currently well within reach of the 400 health departments in Germany. At
first sight, this limit may appear low (about one case per working day per health department). However,
identifying, contacting and counselling all contact persons (thus many more persons than 300), and finally
testing them and controlling their quarantine requires considerable effort.
Any testing can in principle produce both false-positive (quarantined individuals who were not infected) and
false-negative (non-quarantined infected individuals) cases. False-positive rates in theory should be very low
(0.2 % or less for RT-PCR tests). However, testing and handling of the probes can induce false-positive
results [52–55]. Under low prevalence of SARS-CoV-2, false-positive could therefore outweigh true-positive,
especially for the random testing strategy, where the number of tests required to detect new infections would
be very high [39, 56]. This should be carefully considered when choosing an appropriate testing strategy, but
has not explicitly modeled here, as it does not contribute strongly to whether or not the outbreak could be
controlled.
Model Equations
The contributions of the spreading dynamics and the TTI strategies are summarized in the equations below.
They govern the spreading dynamics of case numbers in and between the hidden and the traced pool, H and
T . We assume a regime of low prevalence and low immunity, i.e. the majority of the population is susceptible.
Thus, the dynamics are completely determined by spread (characterized by the reproduction numbers Rt),
recovery (characterized by the recovery rate Γ), external influx Φ and the impact of the TTI strategies:
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dT
dt
= Γ
(
νRHt − 1
)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
spreading dynamics
+λsHs + λrH︸ ︷︷ ︸
testing
+ f (Hs, H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tracing
, (1)
dH
dt
= Γ
(
RHt − 1
)
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
spreading dynamics
− (λsHs + λrH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
testing
− f (Hs, H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tracing
+ ΓRHt T︸ ︷︷ ︸
missed contacts
+ Φ︸︷︷︸
external influx
, (2)
1
1−ξap
dHs
dt
= Γ
(
RHt H −
Hs
1−ξap
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
spreading dynamics
− (λs + λr)H
s
1−ξap︸ ︷︷ ︸
testing
− f (Hs, H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tracing
+ ΓRHt T︸ ︷︷ ︸
missed contacts
+ Φ︸︷︷︸
external influx
, (3)
Ha =H −Hs, (4)
with f(Hs, H) = min
{
nmax, ηR
H
t (λsHs + λrH)
}
. (5)
Equations (1) and (2) describe the dynamical evolution of both the traced and hidden pools. They are
however not sufficient to completely describe the underlying dynamics of the system in the hidden pool, as the
symptomatic and asymptomatic subpools behaves slightly different: only from the symptomatic hidden pool
(Hs) cases can be removed because of symptom-driven testing. Thus the specific dynamics of Hs is defined
by equation (3). The dynamics of the asymptomatic hidden pool (Ha) can be inferred from equation (4). In
the traced compartment, the asymptomatic and symptomatic pools do not need to be distinguished, as their
behavior is assumed to be identical. Equation (5) reflects a potential limit nmax of the tracing capacity of the
health authorities. It is expressed as the total number of positive cases that can be detected from tracing the
contacts of people who were detected via symptom-driven testing (from Hs) or via random testing (from H).
Central epidemiological parameters that can be observed
In the real world, the disease spread can only be observed by the traced pool. While the true number of
daily infections N is a sum of all new infections in the hidden and traced pools, the observed number of daily
infections Nˆobs is the number of new infections in the traced pool delayed by a variable reporting delay α.
This includes internal contributions and contributions from testing and tracing:
N(t) = ΓRTt T (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
traced pool
+ ΓRHt H(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hidden pool
+ Φ︸︷︷︸
external influx
(6)
Nˆobs(t) =
[
ΓνRHt T (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
traced pool
+λsHs(t) + λrH(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
testing
+ f(Hs(t), H(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
tracing
]
~ G[α = 4, β = 1](t), (7)
where f(Hs, H) is defined in (5), ~ denotes a convolution and G a Gamma distribution that models a variable
reporting delay. The spreading dynamics are usually characterized by the observed reproduction number Rˆobst ,
which is calculated from the observed number of new cases Nˆobs(t). We here use the definition underlying
the estimates that are published by Robert-Koch-Institute, the official body responsible for epidemiological
control in Germany [57]: the reproduction number is the relative change of daily new cases N separated by 4
days (the assumed serial interval of COVID-19 [58]):
Rˆobst =
Nˆobs(t)
Nˆobs(t− 4) (8)
Rˆefft =
N(t)
N(t− 4) (9)
While only Rˆobst is accessible from the observed new cases, in the model one can also define an effective
reproduction number Rˆefft from the total number of daily new infections.
In contrast to the original definition of Rˆobst [57], we do not need to remove real-world noise effects by
smoothing this ratio.
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Numerical calculation of solutions and critical values.
The numerical solution of the differential equations governing our model were obtained using a versatile solver
based on an explicit Runge-Kutta (4,5) formula, @ode45, implemented in MATLAB (version 2020a), with
default settings. This algorithm allows the solution of non-stiff systems of differential equations in the shape
y′ = f(t, y), given a user-defined time-step (for us, 0.1 days). Suitability and details on the algorithm are
further discussed in [59].
To derive the tipping point between controlled and uncontrolled outbreaks (e.g. critical values of RHt ), and
to plot the stability diagrams, we used the @fzero MATLAB function. This function uses a combination of
bisection, secant, and inverse quadratic interpolation methods to find the roots of a functions. For instance,
following the discussion of Section , RHcrit was determined by finding the roots of the function returning the
real part of the linear system’s largest eigenvalue.
Table 1: Model parameters.
Parameter Meaning Value(default) Range Units Source
M Population size 80 000 000 people Assumed
R0 Basic reproduction number 3.3 2.2–4.4 − [20, 60,61]1
RHt Reproduction number (hid-
den)
1.80 − [2, 62,63]
Γ Recovery rate 0.10 0.08–0.12 day−1 [50, 64–66]
ξ Asymptomatic ratio 0.15 0.12–0.33 − [21, 22]
ϕ Fraction skipping testing 0.20 0.10–0.40 − [15]
ν Isolation factor (traced) 0.10 − Assumed
λr random-testing rate 0 0–0.02 day−1 Assumed
λs symptom-driven testing rate 0.10 0–1 day−1 Assumed
η Tracing efficiency 0.66 − Assumed
Nmax Maximal tracing capacity ≈ 675 200–6000 cases day−1 Assumed2
 Missed contacts (traced) 0.10 − Assumed
Φ Influx rate (hidden) 15 cases day−1 Assumed2
λr,max Maximal test capacity per
capita
0.002 cases day−1 [44, 49]
RTt Reproduction number
(traced)
0.36 − RTt = (ν + )RHt
ξap Apparent asymptomatic ratio 0.32 − ξap = ξ + (1− ξ)ϕ
RHcrit Critical reproduction number
(hidden)
1.89 − Numerically calculated
from model parameters
1This value may depend on cultural and social factors as well as on the estimation methodology.
2Chosen for a country with a population of M = 80 · 106. See methods for considerations.
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Table 2: Model variables.
Variable Meaning Units Explanation
Ha Hidden asymptomatic
pool
people Non-traced, non-isolated people who are asymptomatic or
avoid being tested
Hs Hidden symptomatic pool people Non-traced, non-isolated people who are symptomatic
T a Traced asymptomatic pool people Traced (isolated) people who are asymptomatic
T s Traced symptomatic pool people Traced (isolated) people who are symptomatic
H Hidden pool people Total non-traced people: H = Ha +Hs
T Traced pool people Total traced people: T = T a + T s
N New infections (traced and
hidden)
cases day−1 Given by: N = ΓRTt T + ΓRHt H + Φ
Nˆobs Observed new infections
(influx to traced pool)
cases day−1 Only cases of the traced pool; delayed on average by 4 days
because of reporting
Rˆefft Estimated effective repro-
duction number
− Estimated from the cases of all pools: Rˆefft = N(t)/N(t− 4)
Rˆobst Observed reproduction
number
− The reproduction number that can be estimated only from
the observed cases: Rˆobst = Nˆobs(t)/Nˆobs(t− 4)
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Supplementary Material
On the linear stability of the system
For analyzing the stability of the governing differential equations, namely, whether an outbreak could be
controlled, we studied the linear stability of the system. The linearized system for equations (1)-(3) with
limitless tracing capacity, is given by:
d
dt
(
T
H
Hs
)
=
 Γ (νRHt − 1) λr (ηRHt + 1) λs (1 + ηRHt )ΓRHt Γ (RHt − 1)− λr (1 + ηRHt ) −λs (1 + ηRHt )
(1−ξap) ΓRHt (1−ξap)
(
ΓRHt − λr
(
1 + ηRHt
)) −η (1−ξap)RHt λs − (λs + λr + Γ)
( TH
Hs
)
(S1)
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By studying the eigenvalues of the associated matrix we can infer the stability of the solutions around the
equilibrium. In particular, we define RHcrit as the largest RHt such that the real part of µmax, the largest
eigenvalue of matrix A, is strictly negative.
Equilibrium equations
A system equilibrium is reached when time derivatives equals zero. That is by setting the left hand side
in eqs. (1)-(3) equal to zero, e.g., dT/dt = 0. Regarding the SIR-like model presented here, an equilibrium
with non-zero new cases can be attained for a positive constant influx Φ and certain combination of the
parameters, depending on whether the health authority’s tracing capacity is exceeded or not. For the case in
which it is not exceeded, the equilibrium is stable as soon as RHt < RHcrit (RHcrit is calculated in Table 1) and
given by the following set of equations:
Te =
Φ
Γ
(
1− νRHt
) [( RHt
νRHt − 1
+RHt
)
− (RHt − 1) ηRHt + 1+Γ/λs1−ξapηRHt + 1
]−1
(S2)
He =
Φ
Γ
(
RHt − 1
)
[( RHt
νRHt − 1
+RHt
)
− (RHt − 1) ηRHt + 1+Γ/λs1−ξapηRHt + 1
]−1(
1 + R
H
t
νRHt − 1
)
− 1
 (S3)
Hse =
Φ
λs
(
1 + ηRHt
) [( RHt
νRHt − 1
+RHt
)
− (RHt − 1) ηRHt + 1+Γ/λs1−ξapηRHt + 1
]−1
(S4)
Otherwise, when the tracing capacity is exceeded (ηλsRHt Hse > nmax), the equilibrium determined by:
Te =
− (λsHse + nmax)
Γ
(
νRHt − 1
) (S5)
He =
(λsHse + nmax)
Γ
(
RHt − 1
) [1 + RHt
νRHt − 1
− Φ
Γ
(
RHt − 1
)] (S6)
Hse =
nmax
(
RHt
νRHt − 1
+ 1
)
− Φ(
RHt − 1
)
(λs + Γ)
1− ξap −R
H
t λs
(
1 + 
νRHt − 1
) (S7)
It is important to note that an equilibrium can be reached even if the number of individuals entering the
hidden pool is different from zero. This equilibrium exhibits a stable number of daily new cases.
Parameter uncertainty propagation
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Table S1: Parameter uncertainty propagation
Parameter Meaning Mean 95% CI α β Dist. Units
ξap Apparent Asymptomatic ratio 0.32 0.19–0.47 13.1 27.8 beta −
λs Symptom-driven test rate 0.10 0.05–0.16 10.7 96.3 beta days−1
ν Isolation factor (traced) 0.10 0.03–0.22 3.5 31.5 beta −
η Tracing efficiency 0.66 0.59–0.73 117.9 60.7 beta −
 Missed contacts (traced) 0.10 0.03–0.22 3.5 31.5 beta −
RHcrit
∣∣∣
η=0.66
Critical reproduction number
(hidden) (with <η>= 0.66)
1.90 1.42–2.70 − − − −
RHcrit
∣∣∣
η=0
Critical reproduction number
(hidden) (with η = 0)
1.42 1.23–1.69 − − − −
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Figure S2: Propagation of TTI-parameter uncertainties to the critical reproduction number. As the
different parameters involved in our model play different roles, the way their variability propagates to RHcrit differs,
even when their variability profiles look similar. (A) Univariate uncertainties of TTI parameters modelled by beta
distributions centered on their default value (left column), and the resulting distribution of critical reproduction
numbers (right column). Results are shown for the RHcrit assuming testing only (light colors) or testing and tracing
(dark colors). (B) Distribution of critical reproduction numbers arising from multivariate uncertainty propagation
given by the joint of the distributions shown in (A) for testing only, or testing and tracing. Results show averages of
100 000 realizations.
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